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PIG IN A POKE: MISSOURI DRAWS TENUOUS LINE BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH AND




Government regulation of large hog farms and confinement operations has become a matter of
growing public concern and increased litigation throughout states with economies based, in large part, on
agriculture and farming.2 Missouri has been no exception to this trend.3 On one side, environment and
health concerns have caused many to advocate treating concentrated animal feeding operations
("CAFO's") with caution.4 On the other hand, advocates of the facilities say they will be of economic
benefit to the communities in which they are located, and therefore should be allowed to operate as freely
as possible. During the short history of CAFO's in Missouri, the balance between these competing
perspectives has seldom been harmonious, and the current battleground on which these interests face off
is the state legislature.6 In 1994, the state legislature promulgated regulations which governed CAFO's
by setting buffer distances between CAFO's and their surrounding communities and also by allowing for
local control of CAFO's by the communities in which they are located.7 Also in 1994, the state
legislature passed a law that allowed county commissions to regulate CAFO's in their counties in order to
promote public health and prevent the spread of disease.8 Those laws are counterbalanced, however, by
Mo. REV. STAT. § 64.620, which authorizes county commissions to establish zoning ordinances for
unincorporated portions of such counties,9 but which expressly states that zoning ordinances may not
regulate livestock production.' 0 In Borron v. Farrenkopf, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District addressed the question of whether ordinances promulgated by the Linn County Commission
regulating CAFO's were health ordinances promulgated under MO. REV. STAT. § 192.300, or zoning
ordinances prohibited by Mo. REV. STAT. § 64.620. In so doing, the court struck a blow against
corporate farms and pollution, and in favor of family farms, good public health and the environment.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The county commissioners of Linn County, Missouri, passed a health ordinance that promulgated
regulations regarding the permits necessary to operate a CAFO." The ordinance was passed pursuant to
5 S.W.3d 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
2 See Goodell v. Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 1998); Welsh v. Centerville Township, 595 N.W.2d 622 (N.D.
1999): County Zoning Authority to Regulate Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 1999 WL 238975 (Tenn. A.G.).
3 See Premium Standard Farms, Inc. v. Lincoln Township of Putnam County, 946 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. 1997). See also Clay
County v. Harley and Susie Bogue, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
4 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 640.710.1 (1994) ("Such rules shall be designed to afford a prudent degree of environmental
protection while accommodating modem agricultural practices.").
s See Matt M. Drummermuth. A Summary and Analysis of Laws Regulating the Production of Pork in Iowa and Other Major
Pork Producing States, 2 DRAKE JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL LAW 447, 451 (1997).
6 See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 640.710-.758 (1994).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 640.710.
8 Mo. REV. STAT. § 192.300 (1994).
9 Mo. REv. STAT. § 64.620.1 (1994).
o0 Mo. REv. STAT. § 64.620.2 (1994).
1 Borron. 5 S.W.3d at 619. See also LINN COUNTY, Mo., CODE § 97-01 (1997).
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Mo. REv. STAT._§ 193.300. 12 The ordinance outlined requirements which landowners must meet to avoid
the damage that could be caused to soil, air and water by CAFO's.13 The ordinance also included
building and setback requirements relevant to CAFO's.14
Plaintiffs-appellants Jeremy and Janice Borron ("the Borrons") owned 1,210 adjacent acres of
land in Linn County.15 The Borrons wished to use this land to conduct a hog-finishing operation
consisting of 18,000 hogs, as well as a farrowing operation involving approximately 2,750 sows.' 6 The
Borrons filed for declaratory relief from the county ordinance. The issues in the trial court and on
appeal were whether Linn County was either forbidden by state law or, in the alternative, was without the
necessary authority to enact the ordinance in question, and whether other state statutes preempted Linn
County from enacting the ordinance. The trial court granted Linn County's motion for summary
judgment, determining that the ordinance was valid and enforceable.' 9
The Borrons claimed that Mo. REV. STAT. § 64.620 preempted the Linn County ordinance by
depriving second and third class counties, such as Linn County, of the power to legislate building
restrictions on land used for the raising of livestock, 20 and that a county may only exercise power
expressly granted to it by the state. 2' The court relied upon Missouri case law, however, to determine that
even though the ordinance in question did possess zoning qualities, the ordinance was a health ordinance
rather than a zoning ordinance, and that Linn County was authorized to promulgate health ordinances.
The court stated that the Linn County ordinance in dispute was rationally related to the health problems
that can result from CAFO's and was therefore permissible under § 192.300.23
The Borrons next claimed that the county ordinance was inconsistent with state law and therefore,
was preempted by state law.24 The court, however, stated that although the Linn County ordinance did
require CAFO's to comply with regulations additional to those outlined in §§ 640.700 through 640.758 of
Missouri law, the county was entitled to require CAFO's to comply with additional requirements.
Moreover, the court stated its position that although the Linn County ordinance promulgated additional
requirements to be met by CAFO's, those additional requirements did not amount to a prohibition on
CAFO' s26
The Borrons next argued that the Linn County ordinance was unenforceable because it regulated
an area already regulated by state law. 27 The court determined, however, that the § 640.710(5) statement
2 Borron, 5 S.W.3d 618, 619. See also Mo. REV. STAT. § 192.300 (1994). Section 193.300 is part of a chapter of the
Revised Statutes of Missouri which addresses the issues of public health and welfare. The section allows county commissions to
create ordinances designed "to enhance the public health and prevent the entrance of infections ... or dangerous diseases into
such county, but ... shall not be in conflict with rules or regulations ... made by the department of health or the department of
social services." The opening paragraph of the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District's opinion in Borron v.
Farrenkopf states that the Linn County Commission enacted the relevant ordinance pursuant to Mo. Rev. STAT. § 193.300. It
would appear that this statement is a typographical error, as nowhere else in the opinion is Mo. REV. STAT. § 193.300. mentioned,
and the remainder of the opinion liberally references Mo. REv. STAT. § 192.300.
'3 Borron, 5 S.W.3d at 619.
14 Id. See also LINN COUNTY, Mo., CODE § 97-01 (1997). The setback requirements outline the minimum distance which
must exist between CAFO's, as well as the minimum distances between CAFO's and occupied dwellings, and CAFO's and
populated areas.
5 Borron, 5 S.W.3d at 619.
16 Id.




21 Borron, 5 S.W.3d at 620.
22Id. at 621.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 623.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 624.
" Borron, 5 S.W.3d at 624.
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that "nothing in this section shall be construed as restricting local controls," showed the state legislature's
intent to leave the issue of CAFO's open for local regulation.28
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District held that because Linn County was given
the authority to make health ordinances to promote the public health and prevent the spread of disease
into the community, and because the disputed ordinance was not a zoning ordinance, but rather, a health
ordinance, Linn County was permitted, under Mo. REV. STAT. § 192.300, to enact such an ordinance.29
Additionally, the court held that state law did not preempt the ordinance because the ordinance was not in
conflict with any state law and because state law did not occupy the area governed by the ordinance.3o
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In most states, the purposes behind regulation of CAFO's have included environmental concerns
regarding water quality as well as the state's desire to compete economically with other pork-producing
states and countries.3 1
In 1997, the county commissioners of Linn County, Missouri, passed a health ordinance that
promulgated regulations regarding the permits necessary to operate a concentrated animal feeding
operation (CAFO).32 The ordinance was passed pursuant to Mo. REV. STAT. § 193.300." The ordinance
outlined requirements which landowners must meet to avoid the damage that could be caused to soil, air
and water by CAFO's. 34 The ordinance also included building and setback requirements relevant to
CAFO's.3
Section 193.300 is part of a chapter of the Revised Statutes of Missouri that addresses the issues
of public health and welfare.36 The section grants "home rule" power to county commissions by allowing
them to create ordinances designed to promote the public health and prevent the outbreak of infectious
diseases in the county. The statute notes, however, that such county ordinances shall not conflict with
rules or regulations promulgated by the Missouri Department of Health or the Missouri Department of
Social Services.38
Section 64.620 is included in a chapter of the Revised Statutes of Missouri relating to planning
and zoning in second- and third-class counties.39 Like § 192.300, § 64.620 is also a "home rule" statute in
that it gives second- and third-class counties such as Linn the power to regulate, in unincorporated areas,
matters such as the location, size and use of buildings.40 But § 64.620.2 of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri notes that the provisions of § 64.620 shall not apply to land used for the raising of livestock.4'
In Premium Standard Farms, Inc. v. Lincoln Township of Putnam County, the Supreme Court of
Missouri noted that local governments have no inherent powers and instead are limited to the powers
expressly delegated them by the sovereign, and the powers necessarily implied in order to carry out the
enumerated powers.42 A county is limited to only the powers granted to it in express terms, the powers
28 Id. (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 640.710(5) (1994)).
29 Borron, 5 S.W.3d at 625.
0 Id.
3 See Drummermuth. supra note 5 at 449.
32 Borron. 5 S.W.3d at 619. See also LINN COUNTY, MO., CODE § 97-01 (1997).
3 Id. See also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 192.300 (1994).
3 Borron, 5 S.W.3d at 619.
3s Id. See also LLNN COUNTY, Mo., CODE § 97-01 (1997). The setback requirements outline the minimum distance which
must be between CAFO's. as well as the minimum distances between CAFO's and occupied dwellings, and CAFO's and
populated areas.
6 See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 192.005-.323 (1994).
37 Mo. REV. STAT. § 192.300 (1994).
38 Id.
3 See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 64.510-727 (1994).
Mo. Rev. STAT. § 64.620.1 (1994).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 64.620.2 (1994).
Premium Standard Farms, Inc. v. Lincoln Township of Putnam County, 946 S.W.2d 234, 238 (quoting Robert H. Freilich,
3F
MELPR, Vol. 8, No. I
necessarily implied in order to implement the express powers, and powers deemed essential to the
purposes of the county, the court said.43 When a county commission goes beyond these limitations in
promulgating regulations, or, alternatively, the commission's act is expressly preempted by the state, the
commission's act is void."
In Avanti Petroleum, Inc. v. St. Louis County,4 5 the county enacted an ordinance requiring
vendors of tobacco products to be licensed by the county department of health." Another purpose behind
the ordinance was to prevent tobacco vendors from selling tobacco products to minors under 18 years of
age.47 The court determined that the purpose of the ordinance was to regulate the use of tobacco, a known
hazardous substance. 48 Thus, the restrictions imposed by the ordinance had a rational relation to the
public health, and therefore the ordinance was permissible under § 192.300.49 Thus, although the county
lacked the enumerated power to regulate the sale of tobacco products, the ordinance was still permissible
and valid, as § 192.300 did grant the county the general power to pass ordinances promoting the public
health.o
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri reached a similar decision in
Professional Houndsmen of Missouri, Inc. v. County of Boone. ' In Professional Houndsmen, the court
held that a county could pass an ordinance requiring dog owners to use leashes and to register and
vaccinate their pets because § 192.300 permits counties to promulgate regulations which promote the
public health, and animal control is reasonably related to the mission of preventing disease and promoting
public health.52
As outlined by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Morrow v. City of Kansas City,5 3 there are two
ways that state law may preempt local law.54 First, if the local ordinance conflicts with the state law, then
the ordinance is invalid. 5 It should be noted, however, that although preemption prohibits a county
ordinance from conflicting with state law, it does not prohibit the county from promulgating extra
regulations in addition to the state law already in existence. In other words, for a local ordinance to
conflict with state law, it must be prohibitory rather than regulatory. Alternatively, the local ordinance
will be preempted if the county has legislated the ordinance in an area that is occupied by state law.58
According to the Supreme Court of Missouri in Union Electric Company v. City of Crestwood,59 a local
ordinance infringes upon an area of the law occupied by the state if the body of state law in the area
leaves no room for local control.6o
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In attacking the lawfulness of the Linn County Ordinance, the Borrons advanced several different
Missouri Lw of Land Use Controls: with National Perspectives, 42 UMKC L. REv. 1, 27 (1973).).
43 Id.
4 Lancaster v. County of Atchison, 180 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Mo. 1944).
45 974 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
4 Id. at 508.
47 id.
48 Id. at 509.
49 Id.
s0 Id. at 509.
s 836 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
s2 See id. at 19.
s3 788 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1990).
54 Id. at 281.
ss Id.
56 State ex rel. Hewlett v. Womach, 196 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Mo. 1946).
57 Id.
58 Id.
'9 499 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1973).
60 Id.
32
MELPR, Vol. 8, No. I
arguments. First, the Borrons argued that MO. REV. STAT. § 64.620. deprived the Linn County
Commission of the power to legislate zoning restrictions on farms. In assessing the merits of this
particular argument, the court weighed the positions adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Premium
Standard Farms v. Lincoln Township of Putnam, against the position adopted by the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Eastern District in Avanti Petroleum, Inc. v. St. Louis County.62 The Borrons relied on
Premium Standard to advance the proposition that a county's power is limited to the powers expressly
granted to it by the state, to those powers necessary and proper to effectuate the enumerated powers
granted by the state, or to those powers essential to the purposes of such county.6 In Premium Standard,
Lincoln Township promulgated regulations creating setback and bonding requirements for CAFO lagoons
and buildings." Premium Standard argued that Lincoln Township was prohibited from imposing zoning
regulations on Premium Standard's buildings as they were "farm structures," and therefore exempt from
county zoning regulations.65 The Missouri Supreme Court held that the lagoons and buildings in dispute
in the case were "farm structures" and therefore were exempted from county zoning ordinances.6
The Borron court contrasted Premium Standard with Avanti Petroleum Inc. v. St. Louis County,
in which St. Louis County, acting under the auspices of Mo. REV. STAT. § 192.300, enacted an ordinance
which prohibited the sale of tobacco products by vendors not licensed by the county board of health.
The plaintiffs in the case, a group of tobacco retailers located in the county, claimed that the ordinance
was not a valid health measure because it was not reasonably related to public health.68 The court,
however, stated that tobacco was a known health hazard and thus, the ordinance was rationally related to
promoting the public health.69 Moreover, the court stated that under Mo. REV. STAT. § 192.300, a county
is not limited in the means it may employ to protect its citizenry from known health hazards.70
The Borron court was more persuaded by the decision in Avanti Petroleum than by the decision
of the Missouri Supreme Court in Premium Standard.1 Because the county ordinance at issue in Borron
referenced its own intention to protect the public health, and because health problems can easily be linked
to livestock animals, the court rejected the Borrons' contention that the Linn County ordinance was a
zoning rather than a health statute.72 The court thus determined that the Linn County ordinance was
permissible under Mo. REV. STAT. § 192.300.
The Borrons next argued that the Linn County ordinance was preempted by state law, because it
was in direct conflict with state law, specifically, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 640.700 through 640.758, which
establish state regulations for CAFO's.74 The Borrons argued that because the Linn County ordinance
promulgated regulations in addition to those enumerated in Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 640.700 through 640.758,
the ordinance was in conflict with state law and was thus preempted by state law." The court rejected
this argument, however, on the grounds that the Linn County ordinance merely imposed additions to the
regulations already promulgated by the state, and was therefore, permissible.
The Borrons' final argument was that the Linn County ordinance was unenforceable because it
regulated an area already occupied by state law, namely Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 640.700 through 640.758,
61 Borron, 5 S.W.3d at 620.
62 Id. at 620-21.
63 Id. at 620.
6 See Premium Standard Farms, Inc. v. Lincoln Township of Putnam County, 946 S.W.2d 234, 235-36 (Mo. 1997).
6 Id. at 238.
66 Id. at 240.
67 Avanti Petroleum. Inc. v. St. Louis County, 974 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
61 Id. at 509.
6 See id.
70 Id.
7 Borron. 5 S.W.3d at 621.
'2 Id. at 621-622.
73 Id. at 622.
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which already regulated CAFO's.7 Citing the Supreme Court of Missouri's decisions in the cases of
Union Electric Co. v. City of Crestwood,7 and City of Maryville v. Wood,79 the court determined that the
test for whether state law occupies an area of the law is whether the state "has created a comprehensive
scheme on a particular area of the law, leaving no room for local control."so If the state's laws have done
so, then the local act is preempted.8 ' The Borron Court determined, however, that the rule established by
Union Electric Company and City of Maryville did not apply to the case at hand, because § 640.710(5)
plainly states, "Nothing in this section shall be construed as restricting local controls."82 The Borron
Court interpreted this statement as implying the state legislature's intent of leaving a window for local
regulation of CAFO's.Y Thus, the court reasoned, Linn County's regulations did not conflict with state
law, but rather, only created more rigorous regulations and therefore, were not preempted.
V. COMMENT
In deciding the case of Borron v. Farrenkopf, the Supreme Court of Missouri clearly issued an
opinion that was friendly to the environment, but the court based its decision upon tenuous reasoning.
The determinative issue in the case was whether the Linn County ordinance in question was a zoning
statute or a health statute.85 In rejecting the Borrons' contention that the case should be governed by
Premium Standard Farms, Inc. v. Lincoln Township of Putnam County, the court noted that in Premium
Standard, Lincoln Township had enacted a zoning statute which provided no indication that it was
intended to guard the health of the community.86 Although the court admitted that the Linn County
Ordinance did possess a zoning quality, the court found more persuasive a line of case law and research
describing the health-related issues stemming from corporate hog farms.87 The court stated that the Linn
County ordinance logically followed this line of legal reasoning, stating that the ordinance's setback .
requirements and building regulations were rationally related to the purpose of public health.88 Although
the Linn County ordinance repeatedly mentions that it arose out of the county commission's concern for
the public health,89 it nevertheless cannot be denied that the ordinance attempts to realize its lofty goals
through the xromulgation of regulations which possess at least some of the elements of typical zoning
regulations.
The Borron Court implied that the test for whether an ordinance is related to zoning or health is
whether the purpose of the ordinance is to regulate for health concerns rather than for a uniform
n Id.
8 499 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1973).
7 216 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1948).
8 Borron, 5 S.W.3d 618 at 624 (citing Union Electric, 499 S.W.2d at 482 and City ofMaryville, 216 S.W.2d at 77).
81 Id. (citing Union Electric, 499 S.W.2d at 482).
82 Borron, 5 S.W.3d at 624 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. 640.710(5) (1994)).
83 Borron, 5 S.W.3d at 624.
8 Id.
85 See id. at 620 ("The legal questions presented to the trial court, and here on appeal, are whether the County was either
prohibited by state law or without the power to enact the Ordinance, or was preempted from passing the Ordinance because of
other state statutes."). See also id. at 621 ("In the case at bar, the Ordinance enacted by Linn County falls not under the ruling of
Premium Standard as Appellants contend, but under the ruling of Avant/Petroleum [sic]. The Ordinance in question here
'establishes health regulations for concentrated animal feeding operations."').
6 Borron, 5 S.W.3d at 621 (citing Premium Standard Farms, Inc. v. Lincoln Township of Putnam County, 946 S.W.2d at
236).
87 Borron, 5 S.W.3d at 622.
8 Id.
89 LINN COUNTY, Mo., CODE § 97-01 (1997).
90 See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1618 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "zoning" as "The division of a city or town by legislative
regulation into districts and the prescription and application in each district of regulations having to do with structural and
architectural designs of buildings and of regulations prescribing use to which buildings within designated districts may be put.
Division of land into zones, and within those zones, regulation of both the nature of land usage and the physical dimensions of
uses including height [,] setbacks and minimum area.").
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development of real estate.9' It is true that the Linn County ordinance's requirements that CAFO's obtain
county health permits and that CAFO's not threaten water, air and soil quality, seem to be rationally
related to health. Although the ordinance's setback requirements that CAFO's not be located within
certain distances of occupied dwellings could also be justified on health-related grounds, those health-
related justifications could also be little more than pretenses for the fact that many would regard CAFO's
as eyesores.93 Likewise, the ordinance requires that all CAFO's provide adequate security to ensure
proper cleanup in the event of waste spills or other accidents at the facilities, but these ordinances could
also be pretenses for the county attempting to ensure that any CAFO doing business within its borders is
solvent and therefore more likely to provide employment stability for the county's citizens. 94
Nevertheless, the Borron Court was probably properly persuaded by the decision of the Supreme Court of
Iowa in the similar case of Goodell v. Humboldt County, in which the court noted that although the
regulations at issue in that case did advance the health and general welfare of the community, they did not
do so by regulating land usage by district, and thus, were not zoning regulations.
But perhaps the greatest doubt about the true nature of the Linn County ordinance as a health
regulation rather than a zoning regulation is created by the fact that the ordinance allows for hardship
exceptions for some CAFO's.96 Section 7 of the ordinance states that if, due to an exceptional situation or
the condition of a certain parcel of land, the application of the ordinance would create a hardship upon the
landowner, the county commission may authorize a variation from the requirements of the ordinance if
doing so will not substantially harm the public good.97 This provision belies the contention that the
ordinance is really a health regulation by implying that the health risks guarded by the ordinance are not
so great that it is impossible to envision a circumstance in which they would be subjugated to the county's
interest in erecting a CAFO. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the health problems posed by CAFO's
are limited to Linn County alone. If the health risks associated with these facilities are so great, it would
seem to be most sensible to promulgate statewide regulations to prevent disputes of this nature, rather
than leave governance of CAFO's up to the less-informed and often more capricious county commissions
around the state.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problems addressed in Borron v. Farrenkopf could have easily been avoided through
promulgation of responsible state regulations which address the serious health risks posed by CAFO's,
but it's likely that the powerful lobbies of corporate farms have stymied attempts to pass such legislation.
Until such regulations come to fruition, courts and county commissions will need to continue to employ
creative strategies and reasoning like those used by the Linn County Commission and the Borron Court,
in order to reduce the stranglehold of large, industrial farms on a community's government and health.
WILLIAM C. ELLIS
91 See Borron. 5 S.W.3d at 622.
92 LINN COUNTY. Mo., CODE § 97-01 (1997).
9 See LINN COUNTY. Mo., CODE § 97-01 (1997).
9 See LINN COUNTY, Mo., CODE § 97-01 (1997).
9s Goodell v. Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d 486,496 (Iowa 1998).
96 See LINN COUNTY, Mo., CODE § 97-01 (1997).
9 LINN COUNTY. MO., CODE § 97-01 (1997).
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